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ABSTRACT: It is widely held that the content of perceptual experience is propositional in nature. 
However, in a well-known article, “Is Perception a Propositional Attitude?” (2009), Crane has argued 
against this thesis. He therein assumes that experience has intentional content and indirectly argues that 
experience has non-propositional content by showing that from what he considers to be the main reasons 
in favour of “the propositional-attitude thesis”, it does not really follow that experience has propositional 
content. In this paper I shall discuss Crane’s arguments against the propositional-attitude thesis and will 
try to show, in contrast, that they are unconvincing. My conclusion will be that, despite all that Crane 
claims, perceptual content could after all be propositional in nature.
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tra la tesis de la actitud proposicional y muestro, en contraste, que no son convincentes. Mi conclusión es que, a 
pesar de todo lo que dice Crane, el contenido perceptivo podría ser, después de todo, de naturaleza proposicio-
nal.
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It is widely held that the content of perceptual experience is propositional in nature. Let 
us call this claim about perceptual content “the propositional-attitude thesis”. However, 
in a well-known article, “Is Perception a Propositional Attitude?” (2009), Crane has ar-
gued against it. He therein assumes that experience has intentional content and indirectly 
argues that experience has non-propositional content by showing that from what he con-
siders to be the main reasons in favour of the propositional-attitude thesis, it does not re-
ally follow that experience has propositional content. In this article I shall discuss Crane’s 
arguments against the propositional-attitude thesis and will try to show, in contrast, that 
they are unconvincing. My conclusion will be that, despite all that Crane claims, percep-
tual content could after all be propositional in nature. The relevance of a discussion of 
Crane’s article nowadays lies, I believe, not only in that Crane critically examines there, in 
a clear way, two classical arguments for the propositional-attitude thesis (something that is 
not often in the present literature), but also in that, in that paper, he advances a thesis that 
currently is in the centre of much discussion, i.e., that perception is non-propositional (see 
Grzankowski & Montague, 2018). For these reasons, I believe that Crane’s article deserves 
a closer attention than the one it has received.
The structure of the article is as follows. After presenting the propositional-attitude 
thesis [section 1], I will briefly reconstruct Crane’s arguments [section 2]. Then, I shall 
critically examine these arguments in order to show that, based on them alone, we cannot 
conclude that perception does not have propositional content [section 3]. After this, in or-
der to reinforce this conclusion, I will introduce a well-known argument in favour of the 
propositional-attitude thesis that has not been considered by Crane. This argument lends 
positive support to the idea that experience may, after all, have propositional content [sec-
tion 4]. The final section summarizes the results of the previous discussion [section 5].
1. The propositional-attitude thesis
As Crane correctly notes, it is widely accepted nowadays that perceiving is a propositional 
attitude like believing or intending. The following pair of quotations can serve to illustrate 
this point.1
Searle, for example, claims that “The content of the visual experience, like the content 
of the belief, is always equivalent to a whole proposition. Visual experience is never sim-
ply of an object but rather it must always be that such and such is the case” (Searle, 1983, 
p. 40). In addition, McDowell, in turn, states that “in a particular experience in which one 
is not misled, what one takes in is that things are thus and so. That things are thus and so is 
the content of the experience, and it can also be the content of a judgment” (McDowell, 
1998, p. 26).2
Although these two philosophers hold slightly different conceptions about what per-
ceptual experience is, both believe that the content of experience is propositional in nature. 
1 I mention recent works here, but see Wittgenstein (Tractatus, 5.5423) and Sellars (1997, p. 40). Sellars 
(1967) changed his view about the propositional content of experience in favour of a conception ac-
cording to which perceptual content is demonstrative.
2 For other statements of this view, see Tye (1995); Glüer (2014); Byrne (2005), and Peacocke (1983). 
Peacocke (1992a, 1992b) and McDowell (2009) abandoned the propositional-attitude thesis.
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The notion of propositional content crucially depends on the way one takes propositions 
to be. As is well-known, the term “proposition” has a broad and disparate use in contempo-
rary philosophy. In his article, Crane adopts what he takes to be the usual understanding of 
propositional content, or propositions, as the bearers of truth-value, the meanings of indic-
ative sentences, the referents of that-clauses and the relata of truth-functional logical rela-
tions.
Moreover, Crane notes that the term “content”, such as it appears in notions like “in-
tentional content”, “propositional content” and “content of experience”, belongs within 
the theory of intentionality. Intentional mental states (hopes, beliefs, experiences, fears, 
etc.) typically have objects and contents. It is commonly claimed that the object of an in-
tentional state is the item towards which the state is directed. For example, in a state of 
desire there is something that is desired. What is desired is the object of the desire. In the 
case of belief, the object of a belief is what it is about, and so on. In some cases, the object 
of an intentional state might be something that does not or cannot exist (e.g. a centaur or a 
squared-circle). But in other cases, the object of an intentional state actually exists. In these 
cases, the intentional object is an ordinary, real thing or state of affairs.
According to Crane, there are three important reasons for introducing the idea of con-
tent in addition to that of intentional object. Firstly, the object of a mental state can be rep-
resented in different ways, even when the mental states are of the same kind (belief, desire, 
etc.). The different ways in which an object is represented in a mental state are the aspects 
under which the object is represented. These aspects are what are usually called “the con-
tents of intentional states”. Secondly, even when a mental state is not directed toward any 
real object, there is something real in each intentional state: there is a representation of an 
object, whether that object is real or unreal. The way the putative object of a state is repre-
sented is said to be its content. Finally, intentional states can represent their objects in an 
accurate or inaccurate way. The fact that intentional states can be accurate or inaccurate is 
the third typical reason for introducing the notion of content.
Now, how is all this applied to the case of perceptual experience? As Crane points 
out, it can be plausibly claimed that perceptual experiences, like other intentional states, 
have objects and contents. Their objects are what is seen, what is heard and so on. And 
since different experiences of the same kind (visual, auditory, etc.) can differ regarding 
the aspect under which they present their objects; since they can also represent what 
does not exist (for instance, in case of hallucination) and, finally, since they can be accu-
rate or inaccurate (think of the distinction between veridical, illusory and hallucinatory 
experiences), it can also be held that experiences have intentional contents. The content 
of experience, then, is said to be equivalent to the way, or aspect, according to which the 
world is perceptually presented. Crane’s challenge is directed not toward the very idea of 
perceptual content but rather to a particular way of understanding it, i.e., as being propo-
sitional in nature.3
3 Recently, some philosophers have questioned the very idea that perceptual experience has intentional 
content. See Brewer (2006, 2011); Travis (2004); Campbell (2002); Johnston (2006); Raleigh (2013), 
and Fish (2009). Responses to this line of thought can be found in McDowell (2013); Ginsborg 
(2011), and Schellenberg (2011). In this paper I shall assume, as Crane and many other philosophers 
do, that experience does, in fact, have representational content.
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2. Crane’s objections
In his article, Crane begins by noticing that those who think perception is a propositional 
attitude often point to the fact that experiences have accuracy conditions (see, for exam-
ple, Searle, 1983). An experience is accurate in this sense if and only if it has an actual ob-
ject which is as the experience represents it as being. In this view, the content of the expe-
rience is the proposition which gives the way the object of the experience is represented as 
being. For example, when I see the grey cat on the mat (Crane’s example), my experience 
represents it in a particular way. The experience is accurate if that is the way the cat and 
the mat really are. The content of the experience is, then, the proposition that the cat is on 
the mat.
It is worth noting here that the propositional-attitude thesis is not the thesis that per-
ceptions are beliefs (Armstrong, 1968; Davidson, 2001; Glüer, 2009, and Byrne, 2009); 
rather, it is the idea that the content of experience is of the same kind as the content of be-
lief or judgment. What one can judge or believe is a proposition, that is, something that 
is true or false. Since propositions are true or false, the propositional-attitude thesis states 
that the contents of experiences can also be true or false. Crane’s objections, then, are spe-
cifically directed toward this thesis. Here is Crane’s own thesis: “the content of experience 
is not propositional, and so it cannot be the kind of thing that can be the content of a belief 
or judgment” (Crane, 2009, p. 453).4
For his part, Crane does not directly argue for the claim that experience has non-prop-
ositional content; instead, assuming that experiences have intentional content, he ar-
gues against the propositional-attitude thesis and, thereby, concludes that this content is 
non-propositional in nature. This is the reason why his main thesis is only indirectly sup-
ported. So, schematically speaking, Crane’s argument is as follows: (1) perceptual experi-
ences have intentional content; (2) the intentional content of experiences can be propo-
sitional or non-propositional in character; (3) the main reasons that have been offered to 
4 Despite this quotation, someone might think that it is not obvious that Crane’s article is correctly un-
derstood as an attack on the propositional-attitude thesis; rather, it may be viewed as, merely, an at-
tempt to block some arguments that have been assumed to force us to accept that thesis. At this point, 
I do not want to deny that such weaker reading is possible. From that reading, Crane would look more 
prudent than I think he is. However, I should say two things: first, I do not see that such weaker read-
ing introduces any actual difference for my arguments in the present paper. I am arguing, mainly, that 
Crane’s objections against two well-known arguments for holding the propositional-attitude thesis are 
not sound. Thus, it is not important whether Crane actually wants to reject the propositional-attitude 
thesis or, simply, he aims to block the arguments that have been proposed in favour of it. In any case, 
the propositional-attitude thesis remains standing and, as a result, there is no motivation for holding 
or suggesting that perception has non-propositional content. Second, there is further textual evidence 
that corroborates my reading. For example, Crane (2013b, p. 240) claims: “I have argued elsewhere 
that experiences have non-propositional content, in the sense that their fundamental way of repre-
senting the world is non-propositional”. And here “elsewhere” explicitly refers to the paper I am crit-
icizing. Still, in another place, Crane defends the idea that experience has non-propositional content. 
He claims: “Seeing, noticing, admiring, loving, liking —all of these states are directed upon objects un-
der aspects. They do not have propositional contents” (Crane, 2013a, p. 105. See also pp. 103-104). 
Hence, I believe that Crane is actually committed with the idea that experience has non-propositional 
content and, therefore, with a rejection of the propositional-attitude thesis.
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support the thesis that experiences have propositional content are not sound at all; (4) in 
consequence, the contents of experiences are non-propositional in nature.5
In order to criticize the propositional-attitude thesis, Crane presents two lines of crit-
icism, which correspond to the two arguments he considers to be the ones that mainly 
support the thesis in question. The first one focuses, with regards to a content, on the dis-
tinction between its being accurate or inaccurate on the one hand, and true or false on 
the other hand. Crane’s second line of criticism points out that describing a certain kind 
of content in propositional terms does not actually imply that the content so described is 
propositional in nature. Let us examine each line of criticism in more detail.
Crane argues that, the mere fact that experiences can be accurate or inaccurate is not 
sufficient to conclude that they can be true or false (Searle, 1983, p. 41, seems to make this 
mistake). Crane holds that: “Accuracy is not truth since accuracy admits of degrees and 
truth does not” (Crane, 2009, p. 458). For example, a picture—Crane says—can be more 
or less accurate, but it is not true or false. In contrast, a proposition cannot be more or less 
true. Truth and falsehood do not admit degrees; they are all or nothing.6 Thus, since what 
are true or false are propositions, Crane concludes that the argument from accuracy-con-
ditions does not support the idea that perceptual experiences have propositional content.
Moreover, the possibility of being true or false is central to the idea of a proposition 
since truth and falsehood (and not merely adequacy and inadequacy) are the semantic con-
cepts of propositional logic. Truth-functions operate on propositions: propositions can be 
negated, disjoined and conjoined; in contrast, pictures cannot stand in logical relations to 
each other: they cannot be negated or disjoined, for example. In this sense, Crane argues, 
experiences are like pictures: “if a proposition were the content of a perceptual experience, 
then it should be capable of being negated, disjoined, conjoined, etc. But it seems that just 
as one cannot do these things to the content of pictures, one cannot do them to the con-
tents of experiences either”, (Crane, 2009, p. 462). Crane’s conclusion is, then, that percep-
tual experiences can only be accurate or inaccurate (but not true or false) and that they can-
not stand in logical relations to each other. This is Crane’s first line of criticism.
Nevertheless, the propositional-attitude theory may be defended in another way. It 
may be conceded that the content of a picture cannot be asserted, negated, disjoined, etc., 
but it could still be argued that there can always be a sentence that has the same content as 
a picture: the sentence could accurately describe what a picture represents and how it rep-
resents it. Since sentences which express propositions can effectively be asserted, negated, 
disjoined, etc., then, to the extent to which the content of pictures could be described by 
sentences, it could be claimed that their contents can, after all, stand in logical relations to 
one another. And similar considerations may also be applicable to the case of experience.
However, Crane argues that “describing the content and being the content are not 
the same thing” (Crane, 2009, p. 460). The content of a representation is how its object is 
represented. Content in this sense could be described in many ways. According to Crane, 
5 In the light of recent discussions about the non-propositional character of some attitudes, it is impor-
tant to highlight here that Crane’s thesis is that experience has representational non-propositional con-
tent. His thesis is not, then, that experience is, merely, a certain kind of attitude directed towards ob-
jects.
6 Crane does not justify the comparison (intuitive only in the case of visual experiences) between experi-
ences and pictures.
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then, one can represent the condition for the correctness of a representation (e.g. a picture) 
by means of a sentence without the representation itself being sentence-like. Therefore, 
even if a sentence gives the content of a representation, this is not enough to make this rep-
resentation propositional in nature. Now, by exploiting the analogy between pictures and 
perceptual experiences, Crane concludes that the same point can be made for the case of ex-
periences: describing their contents in propositional terms does not entail that experiences 
themselves are propositional in character. This is Crane’s second line of criticism to the 
propositional-attitude theory.
3. Objections to Crane’s objections
Crane’s arguments are interesting and certainly shed new light on some problems about per-
ceptual content; in my view, however, they are unconvincing. Let us consider his first line of 
criticism. It is true that, as Crane observes, the fact that experience has accuracy-conditions 
is not sufficient to conclude, without more qualifications, that experience has truth-condi-
tions. However, neither does this, by itself, imply that the content of experience is not true 
or false and, thus, that experience is not a propositional attitude. There is not a direct and 
simple inference which leads from the acknowledgment that accuracy is not equivalent to 
truth to the conclusion that experiences are not true or false; nor, consequently, to the thesis 
that experiences have non-propositional content. Let us examine this in more detail.
Crane believes that pictures, for instance, can be more or less accurate, but not true 
or false. In contrast, propositions are not more or less true. They are true or false, period. 
Analogously, he believes that experiences—which are, in his opinion, more or less accurate 
but not true or false—do not have propositional content. However, Crane explores neither 
the sense in which it may be said that a picture or experience can be accurate or inaccurate, 
nor the relation between truth and accuracy. In my view, these points deserve careful atten-
tion because it can be said, in a natural way, that both pictures and experiences can be, in 
one sense, true or false and, in another sense, accurate or inaccurate.7 Consequently, if one 
takes this into account, one can see that Crane’s arguments do not actually suffice to un-
dermine the thesis according to which perception has propositional content.
In effect, it should be noted that the terms “accurate” and “inaccurate” can be applied 
not only to pictures, but also to linguistic items, such as remarks and descriptions. For in-
stance, it could be said that a description is more or less accurate depending on the amount 
of true propositions it includes. In this sense, it may be sensibly claimed that a description 
that only includes true propositions is more accurate than one that also includes some false 
propositions. Regarding this sense in which descriptions can be said to be accurate or inac-
curate, it is clear how truth and falsehood, on the one hand, and accuracy and inaccuracy, 
on the other, are related to each other: the accuracy of a description is a function of the 
amount of true propositions it involves.
I believe that similar considerations apply to the case of pictures. Admittedly, the con-
tent of pictures is very rich indeed. A picture of my room, for instance, could represent 
7 Of course, pictures and experiences could be accurate or inaccurate in many ways. Here I assume that 
Crane uses the terms “accurate” and “inaccurate” in a representational sense. 
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many things: where the door is located in reference to the window, the way its furniture is 
arranged, the shape of the desk, the objects that are on it, etc. However, this is no obstacle 
to claiming that its content is propositional. One could simply claim that the content of 
the picture is constituted by a set of propositions, one of which represents the way the fur-
niture is arranged in the room, another of which represents how the desk is, and so on. So, 
for one thing, considering the bits, aspects or parts that compose the content of a picture, it 
could be said that they are true or represent with truth, or truly represent, a thing. The pic-
ture may truly represent, for example, the shape and colour of the desk. Hence, when we 
focus our attention on different aspects of the content of a picture, i.e., when we pay atten-
tion to the different propositions that compose the whole content of a picture, it could be 
claimed that they can be true or false. For another thing, however, in strict parallelism with 
what has already been claimed for the case of descriptions, it could be said that, depending 
on the amount of true aspects, or parts (i.e. propositions), of which the content of a picture 
is composed, the whole picture is more or less accurate or inaccurate. As in the case of de-
scriptions, the accuracy of pictures could be a function of the truth of the parts that com-
pose the whole content of them.
Similar considerations may be applied, I hold, to the case of perceptual experience. At 
this point it may be helpful to note that the content of perceptual experiences can, as hap-
pens in the case of the content of pictures, be very rich. In seeing a certain cup, one can si-
multaneously see its colour, shape, location, etc. In hearing a song, one can hear the sing-
er’s voice, the sound of the instruments, the lyrics, etc. In touching a table, one can sense 
the texture of its surface, its hardness, what shape it has, etc. In this sense, it could be 
thought that perceptual content is composed not of a single proposition (if we accept for 
the moment that perceptual content is propositional) but rather of a set of propositions 
( Peacocke, 1983, p. 5; McDowell, 1998, p. 49, n. 6). However, if we consider a specific as-
pect, or bit, of the content of a visual experience (e.g., the part of the content on which the 
attention is focused) I see no obstacle to claiming that this aspect of the experience is ve-
ridical, if this happened to be the case, or that this bit of the content of the experience is 
true.8 For example, if I needed to decide whether the cup of coffee that is in front of me is 
white or not, I could focus my attention on the colour of the cup and see whether the cup 
is white or not. Let us suppose that the cup is white and that I can perfectly see its colour. 
This is a case in which I may claim that my visual experience is veridical, or that its content 
is true.
But if we now consider the experience as a whole and take into account other aspects 
of the content of my experience of the cup, those which refer to the shape of the cup, the 
material with which it has been made, its location, etc., it may also be said that the expe-
rience is accurate or inaccurate depending on how many of these aspects are true or false. 
If the experience correctly represents every property of the cup on which I focused my at-
tention, it could be claimed that my experience is completely veridical or that its content 
is completely accurate. However, it may be the case that my visual experience represents 
some properties of the cup correctly, whereas it misrepresents some others. Something of 
this sort is typical of visual illusions. For instance, let us consider the well-known case of 
8 Sellars has no issue with the application of the term “truth” to the content of perceptual experiences. 
See Sellars (1997, p. 40). See also Siegel (2010, p. 28) and McDowell (1998, p. 162).
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the lines of Müller-Lyer illusion. Here it could be claimed that one’s visual experience cor-
rectly represents the presence of two lines, whereas it misrepresents their length. A natural 
way of describing this situation for a defender of the propositional-attitude thesis would be 
to claim that the content of such illusory experience is composed, at least in part, by two 
propositions: the proposition that represents the presence of two lines, which is certainly 
true; and the one that represents their relative lengths, which is false.9 Similarly, my expe-
rience of the cup could be decomposed into several propositions (one that represents its 
shape, another that represents its location, and so on), some of which may be true and some 
others false. Thus, it could be claimed that an experience that represents every property of 
the cup truly (i.e. an experience in which all the propositions that compose its content are 
true), is more accurate than the experience that represents truly only some properties of the 
cup in question (i.e., an experience in which only some propositions that compose its con-
tent are true).10
The moral that should be drawn from this discussion is, I think, that nothing rele-
vant to the question of whether perceptual content is propositional in nature or not can 
be obtained by distinguishing, as Crane does, between accuracy-conditions and truth-con-
ditions. The distinction is certainly correct, but it does not prove that experience is not a 
propositional attitude, nor does it undermine the argument from the accuracy-conditions 
of experience: advocates of the propositional-attitude thesis may argue that the fact that ex-
periences have accuracy-conditions is compatible with the view that experiences are both, 
in a certain sense, true or false and, in another sense, accurate or inaccurate. In fact, if my 
considerations on the content of experience are correct, the accuracy or inaccuracy of expe-
rience is a function of the truth or falsehood of the different aspects of its content. So there 
is an intrinsic connection between the fact (if it is actually a fact) that the different aspects 
of the content of experience can be truth or false, on the one hand, and the fact that this 
content is accurate or inaccurate, on the other hand.
9 See the treatment that Siegel gives to this topic in Siegel (2010, chap. 2). Matthen (2014) also holds 
that perceptual experiences can be both accurate or inaccurate, and true or false.
10 Still, someone might argue that, for every part of its content, an experience can be more or less accu-
rate. For example, let us consider the case in which, in looking at a light brown table, one visually expe-
riences it, at different moments, as dark brown, as orange, or as black. Here, even though all these expe-
riences would be wrong, one may rank them with respect to their degree of accuracy, e.g., considering 
that experiencing the table as dark brown is less inaccurate than experiencing it as black. To this chal-
lenge, however, the proponent of the propositional-attitude thesis can respond, I think, as follows: on 
the one hand, she can insist on the point that the crucial thing is that experience must help one to de-
termine what colour the table is, and for this purpose, non-veridical experiences are equally inaccurate. 
The question “Is the table light brown?” is a Yes/No question, and seeing the table must help one to 
determine which answer is the correct one. For this purpose, then, any non-veridical experience leads 
one to the wrong answer. On the other hand, given certain purposes, perhaps one may rank those ex-
periences according to their degree of accuracy, as the objection suggests. Nevertheless, it should be 
noted that something similar goes for sentences or propositions as well. In effect, it may also be said 
that the sentence “The table is dark brown”, though false, represents the colour of the table less inac-
curately than “The table is black”. However, from this, it does not follow that sentences (or the propo-
sitions expressed by them) are not true or false but, rather, only more or less accurate. The same can be 
claimed for the case of experiences. I am indebted to an anonymous referee of Theoria for pressing this 
point.
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Crane’s remark about the impossibility that pictures (and, assuming the comparison, 
experiences) can stand in logical relations to each other raises a more complicated issue. 
Crane’s argument seems to be the following: propositions can be negated, disjoined, etc. 
But pictures cannot be pictorially negated, disjoined, etc. Therefore, pictures have no prop-
ositional content. And, Crane concludes, the same goes for the case of experience.
The topic of whether pictures have propositional content or not has been, and 
still is, a matter of dispute between philosophers (see Westerhoff, 2005; Heck, 2007; 
 Matthen, 2014; Grzankowski, 2015), and I’m afraid that Crane does not sufficiently sup-
port his point of view. Fortunately, I do not need to fully enter into that debate, because 
Crane’s argument, outlined in the previous paragraph, has an important flaw. In effect, as 
Grzankowski (2015) has recently pointed out, even if it is conceded that pictures cannot be 
negated, disjoined etc. without appealing to other non-pictorial resources, it does not fol-
low from this concession alone that they do not have propositional content. It only follows 
that pictures cannot express certain kinds of propositions—negated, disjoined, etc. propo-
sitions—or, to express it more clearly, that pictures’ content cannot be constituted by ne-
gated, disjoined, etc. propositions.
Similar considerations may be valid, I believe, for the case of perceptual experience. 
Even if it is conceded that experiences cannot stand in some logical relations to each other, 
or cannot include negated, disjoined, etc. propositions as their contents, it does not fol-
low from this fact, at least without more argument, that the content of experiences is not 
propositional in character. It only follows that a certain kind of propositions—negated, 
disjointed, etc. propositions—cannot be the content of perceptual experiences. But, what 
is the argument for not believing that experiences have propositional contents such as this 
is a book or this book is red? Certainly, there is a gap here in Crane’s argument. Thus, it 
seems that the possibility that perception has such kind of propositional content remains 
untouched by Crane’s argument. The alleged impossibility of having experiences with ne-
gated, disjoined, etc. propositions may be explained, as Crane suggests for the case of picto-
rial content, by appealing to the particular kind of vehicle of perceptual content. However, 
this is consistent with attributing propositional content to experiences, because one can 
still believe that perceptual vehicles are suitable for carrying propositions that do not in-
clude any logical connectors.
Let us now consider Crane’s second line of criticism. Remember that, according to 
Crane, from the claim that the content of experience can always be described in a sentence 
that expresses a proposition, it does not follow that experience in itself has propositional 
content.11 Crane seems to crucially assume here that whatever the nature of perceptual 
content might be, a sentence can adequately describe it. Therefore, he seems to reason, de-
scribing perceptual content in propositional terms should not be taken as a sign that such 
content is propositional in character. However, Crane’s assumption can be questioned.
11 In the article I am considering here, he uses the case of loving to illustrate his point. He claims that 
although Napoleon’s love for Josephine is a case of an intentional non-propositional state, there is a 
sentence “which describes the content of Napoleon’s love, i.e., describes what he loves and the way in 
which he represents her”, (Crane, 2009, p. 463). The sentence is, according to Crane, this: “There is 
someone who is identical with Josephine” (Crane, 2009, p. 463). Now, according to Crane, this sen-
tence describes the content of Napoleon’s love, “without being the content of his love” (Crane, 2009, 
p. 463).
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Since Crane does not tell us what his conception of perceptual non-propositional con-
tent is, I will appeal to some well-known examples in the literature about that topic.12 In-
deed, non-propositional content may be construed in different ways: for instance, as sce-
nario content (Peacocke, 1992a, 1992b); as intuitional content (McDowell, 2009); or in 
terms of mediational content (Cussins, 2003). However, in contrast to what Crane seems 
to assume, in none of these cases would it be easy to describe the putative non-proposi-
tional content of experience in propositional terms. The general reason of this is straight-
forward: in describing in propositional terms the supposed non-propositional content of 
experience, whatever its variety may be, we would inevitably distort the nature of such a 
kind of content. In effect, the three examples of non-propositional content recently men-
tioned are, in so far as they are non-propositional, contents in which there are no predi-
cates. In all of them, though for different reasons, it is not the case that a predicate is said 
to be applied (or denied) with truth or falsity, to a certain subject. As a result, though it 
may be said that they are contents which can be correct or incorrect in a certain sense, one 
could not say they are true or false. But then, it seems that to describe such kinds of con-
tents by means of sentences, which express propositions, would be invariably to ascribe a 
wrong structure to them. It would be as if we were talking about contents that may be true 
or false, when, in fact, such contents cannot have truth-values at all. Thus, if this were the 
case, our reports of the contents of our experiences would be systematically misleading. 
In such a case, it would not be appropriate to claim, as Crane does, that sentences can ad-
equately describe the contents of perceptual experiences. If my reasoning is correct, sen-
tences would not be suitable devices to describe, or express, the supposed non-proposi-
tional content of experience, whatever its variety might be.13
12 In another place, Crane provides some examples of what he considers to be cases of non-propositional 
content: imagining a horse neighing (Crane, 2013a, p. 101), and a dog represented as threatening in 
a feeling of fear towards it (Crane, 2013a, p. 102). Although these examples are not examples of per-
ceptual non-propositional content, they may give us some cues about what kind of content he has in 
mind. However, these examples are open to dispute. Why should we accept that imagining a horse 
neighing or representing a dog as threatening in a feeling of fear are examples of intentional mental 
states with non-propositional content? The advocate of the propositional attitude thesis could say 
that, insofar as a subject knows what she is representing, she is imagining that a horse is neighing, or 
that a dog is threatening. Although these brief remarks do not settle the question, they suggest, I think, 
that more effort is needed to demonstrate that Crane’s examples are cases of non-propositional con-
tent.
13 Presumably, this is the reason why advocates of non-propositionalism do not typically use sentences 
to describe the putative non-propositional content of experience. For example, McDowell (2009, 
p. 270) appeals to complex demonstrative expressions, such as “This red cube”, in order to express the 
supposed intuitional content of experience. In this case, it is clear, I think, that to express that kind of 
content in propositional terms would distort the nature of such content (it would misleadingly sug-
gest, for example, that perceptual content represents states of affairs when, according to McDowell, it 
only represents objects). Similar considerations may be valid for the case of Cussins’s mediational con-
tent. As Cussins (2003) characterizes it, this kind of content does not represent states of affairs at all. It 
is, rather, a kind of knowing how. It presents the world, not as a truth-maker, but “as an environment 
that mediates activity in the environment’ (Cussins, 2003, p. 155). What Cussins calls ‘the realm of 
mediation’ consists of ‘the trails that distinguish patterns of afforded activity from patterns of resisted 
activity’ (Cussins, 2003, p. 155). The world experienced as the realm of mediation guides us in our ac-
https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.20574 165
Perception as a propositional attitude
Of course, if perception had propositional content, sentences could describe it in a 
suitable way. In seeing that a cup is on the table, for example, we could describe, or make 
explicit, the content of our perception by using the sentence, “The cup is on the table”. 
Thus, I believe that advocates of the propositional-attitude thesis could perhaps insist on 
their point: from the fact that there can always be a sentence that describes perceptual con-
tent, it does follow that such a kind of content is propositional in nature because if such 
content were non-propositional, it could not be properly described by sentences at all.14
At this point, it should be clear that, if experiences were not credited with proposi-
tional contents of any kind, we could not logically operate on their contents even when 
these were expressed linguistically. In effect, the advocate of the propositional-attitude the-
sis can argue that, since negation and conjunction, for example, operate on propositions, it 
would perfectly make sense to claim, in the appropriate contexts, things like these: “Things 
are not as they visually appear!”, or “I saw that the book was on the table and that John 
took it.” In an ordinary understanding of what is expressed by these sentences, what is ne-
gated in the first sentence and put in conjunction in the second one are propositions. Thus, 
if we think that sentences are suitable devices to express the propositional content of ex-
periences, we can logically operate on such contents after all (even when it is conceded to 
Crane that experiences cannot have negated propositions, etc., as their contents). In con-
trast, if experiences were credited with non-propositional content, we could not logically 
operate on the linguistic expressions of them. In effect, the proper linguistic expression of 
such kind of contents would presumably be given, not by complete sentences but, rather, 
by a part of them (e.g., by attributive expressions). But, then, under the assumption that 
tivities in the environment. Correspondingly, Cussins assigns two different sorts of normativity to 
conceptual/propositional and non-conceptual/non-propositional contents. Conceptual/propositional 
contents are constitutively governed by the norm of truth; in contrast, non-conceptual/non-propo-
sitional contents are governed by ‘mundane normativity’, ‘the gentle bumpings of one’s body and in-
formational systems; the cognitive affordances and resistances of the environment’ (Cussins, 2003, 
p. 154). So, as in the case of McDowell’s intuitional content, it seems that mediational content could 
not be properly grasped by a sentence (or set of sentences). The content of sentences can be true or 
false, it typically makes reference to objects and properties in the world, and it aims to represent states 
of affairs. Nothing similar can be said about mediational content. Finally, Peacocke’s scenario contents 
are spatial types, i.e. ways of locating surfaces, features, etc., in relation to a labelled origin and a family 
of axes. Peacocke is clear about why he believes that “a purely propositional account” cannot properly 
explain the representational content of experience: (i) it is parasitic “on something properly treated by 
use of scenarios” (Peacocke, 1992b, p. 113) and (ii) it makes impossible “an adequate account of the 
first-person way of thinking” (Peacocke, 1992b, p. 114). It is not merely the case that, according to 
Peacocke, perceptual content is not propositional in character; it is also that linguist descriptions can-
not properly grasp the putative scenario content of experience: “we have on this account to recognize 
the rather indirect way in which descriptions in ordinary language […] help to characterize the way 
someone is experiencing the world. The ordinary-language characterization of the scenario can be at 
most partial” (Peacocke, 1992b, p. 111).
14 Indeed, it may be argued that our ordinary practice of attributing perceptual experiences to others re-
flects the idea that experience has propositional content. We commonly say things of the following 
kind: “She saw that John took the book”. Sellars (1997, § IV) holds that, in such a case, we not only at-
tribute an experience with propositional content, but that, also, we endorse that content (i.e., we take 
it as true).
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the linguistic devices that are suitable to express the putative non-propositional content of 
experiences are not sentences, we will lose the possibility to logically operate on them. This 
is a high cost to pay for the rejection of the propositional-attitude thesis.15
But let us suppose now that Crane’s crucial assumption is correct, i.e. that whatever the 
nature of perceptual content might be, it could be properly described by a sentence, or a set 
of sentences. Even in this case, Crane’s argument does not support, even indirectly, his the-
sis that experience has non-propositional content. In effect, it should be noted that from 
the mere fact that there is a distinction to make between describing the content and be-
ing the content, it follows neither that perception has propositional content nor that it has 
non-propositional content. Crane’s argument, if it is correct, only shows that there is no 
direct and necessary implication between describing perceptual content in propositional 
terms and that content being propositional in nature. Thus, advocates of the proposition-
al-attitude thesis should not use the fact that perceptual content may be described in prop-
ositional terms as an argument in favour of their thesis. However, Crane’s objection does 
not show, at least by itself, that perceptual content is non-propositional in nature, either. 
The way in which we describe perceptual content is neutral with respect to its nature. In 
fact, it may still be the case that perceptual content is, after all, propositional, and this fact 
could explain, in part, why we commonly use sentences in order to describe it. So if we ac-
cept Crane’s second line of criticism, we can only conclude that the fact that perceptual 
content may be described in propositional terms is not a good reason to believe that such 
content is propositional in nature. However, we cannot conclude, even indirectly, that per-
ceptual content is non-propositional. For this additional thesis, an independent and posi-
tive argument is still required. Thus, Crane’s objection leaves open the question of whether 
perceptual content is propositional or not, and so his second line of criticism does not 
show, in itself, that the content of experience is non-propositional in nature.
We are at an impasse here: from the fact that the content of experience can be de-
scribed by a sentence we can conclude neither that experience has propositional content 
nor that it has non-propositional content. The problem is that Crane believes that his ar-
guments support a negative answer to the question that appears in the title of his article 
(“Is perception a propositional attitude?”). However, if I am right, he has provided us with 
no compelling reason to agree with him. Crane’s objections to the propositional-attitude 
thesis leave untouched the possibility that experience has propositional content. For the 
same reason, it can be claimed that there is no genuine motivation to believe that experi-
ence has non-propositional content.
4. An argument for the propositional-attitude thesis
I have argued so far that the idea that perceptual experiences have accuracy conditions (the 
idea that experiences can be more or less accurate) is perfectly compatible with the idea 
15 In the Introduction to Grzankowski & Montague (2018, p. 16), these authors (two advocates of the 
non-propositional character of some intentional mental states) acknowledge that non-propositional-
ists need, crucially, a logic that shows us how to treat the logical relations between (propositional and) 
non-propositional mental states.
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that their contents can be true or false. Moreover, in contrast to Crane’s position, I have 
pointed out that the fact that perceptual content can be described or made explicit by a 
sentence or a set of sentences, may be proposed as a genuine reason to believe that percep-
tual content is propositional in nature. Finally, I have argued that even in case this last rea-
son were dismissed, the fact that perceptual content may be described in propositional 
terms does not tell us anything regarding the nature of perceptual content. Therefore, we 
cannot conclude, then, even indirectly, that such kind of content is non-propositional in 
character.
But is there another positive motivation (besides those discussed by Crane) to believe 
that experience has propositional content? It is, of course, impossible to settle this question 
here, but what I want to do instead is to present a certain line of thought in favour of the 
propositional-attitude thesis, which has not been considered by Crane. The proposal con-
sists of considering some roles (epistemic and other ones) that are commonly attributed to 
perceptual experience and then asking what kind of content the experience must have in 
order to be able to play these roles. Although this strategy is not completely novel, it has 
not been taken into consideration by Crane and, for this reason, it deserves, I believe, close 
attention here. The existence of that strategy not only indicates a lacuna in Crane’s critical 
examination of the grounds for holding the propositional-attitude thesis, but also it sug-
gests a close connection with the argument from accuracy-conditions defended in the pre-
vious section of this article.
It is widely accepted that, among others (Schellenberg, 2016), experience has, at least, 
the following intuitive roles: (1) providing epistemic reasons for empirical judgments and 
beliefs (McDowell, 1998; Brewer, 1999; Ginsborg, 2011); (2) making possible to under-
stand demonstrative expressions,16 and (3) providing reasons for behaving one way rather 
than another. Now, it could be plausibly argued that, in order to be able to play these intui-
tive roles, experience must have propositional content. I take this to be a strong motivation 
to accept the propositional-attitude thesis.
In order to illustrate my point, I can only consider here the first intuitive role of per-
ceptual experience (1). Imagine that I want to know whether a certain cup is white or not. 
An obvious way of knowing this would consist of looking at the cup and seeing whether it is 
white or not. Let us suppose that, in fact, it is white. As a consequence of seeing the colour 
of the cup, I come to believe, or judge, that the cup is white. Now, let us suppose that I am 
asked why I believe, or judge, that the cup is white. Here, a natural answer could be “Because 
I see that the cup in question is white”. In this case, it seems to be crucial that the content of 
my visual experience is propositional in character, because if it is actually so, it is easy to ex-
plain how my experience could be a reason to believe, or judge, that the cup is white.17
In effect, if experiences are to be reasons at all, their contents must be able to be in the 
relevant logical (inferential or non-inferential) relations with the contents of judgments 
16 See Brewer (1999); Evans (1982); Campbell (2002). I do not want to imply here that Evans and 
Campbell are advocates of the propositional-attitude thesis. I merely mention them as authors that at-
tribute to experience an essential role in the understanding of demonstrative thoughts and expressions.
17 There has been some discussion about what reasons are. See, for example, Alvarez (2010); Turri 
(2009); Ginsborg (2006). Since my specific topic is delimited by the discussion of Crane’s point of 
view about whether experiences —assuming that they have non-propositional content— could be rea-
sons at all, I do not need enter that debate here.
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and beliefs. Now, if the content of my experience is constituted by the proposition that this 
cup is white, the truth of this proposition could be non-inferentially transmitted, by the 
mere identity transition of the contents, to the truth of my belief or judgment.18 In such 
case, the transition from my experience to my judgment or belief could be warranted by the 
very nature of the contents at play (McDowell, 2009, p. 131). If the proposition that con-
stitutes the content of my experience is true, the transition will warrant that my judgment 
or belief will be true as well.
In contrast, and as many philosophers have argued (Huemer, 2001; Thau, 2002; 
 Lyons, 2008; Ginsborg, 2011; Rosenberg, 2002; Glüer, 2014), if experience had non-prop-
ositional content (whatever this kind of content might be), it would be very difficult to see 
how experience could be a reason to judge or believe that things are such and such a way. 
Although those philosophers are not explicit at this point, I think that the ultimate rea-
son for the difficulty is straightforward: non-propositional content (if there actually is such 
a kind of content) does not seem to be suitable to be a bearer of truth-value; and as a con-
sequence, it seems inapt to stand in the required logical relations (inferential or non-infer-
ential) to the contents of judgments and beliefs.19 In effect, whatever this kind of content 
might be, it would surely lack a predicate; but without a predicate, it seems that this kind 
of content could be neither true nor false and, consequently, it could not represent states 
of affairs at all.20 So, it seems that the identity transition of contents, which was taken as a 
model to understand the case of non-inferential justification when experience is credited 
with propositional content, cannot work here.
As an example, let us consider McDowell’s proposal, with which Crane (2013b)21 sym-
pathizes, according to which the intuitional content of a visual experience may be expressed 
18 In more complex cases, the content of the experience could make the truth of a judgment or belief 
more probable. For the idea that perceptual experiences non-inferentially justify judgments and beliefs, 
see McDowell (2009, p. 131).
19 The common thread among the authors mentioned above is the idea that rational justification is in-
ferential. However, if, as I claim, what is at play here is, ultimately, the truth of the justificatory items, 
then, propositional content is needed for non-inferential justification as well.
20 Of course, there are nominalized clauses that can refer, in a certain sense, to states of affairs or facts. In 
our case, it may be thought that ‘the fact that the cup is white’ could express the non-propositional con-
tent of an experience. So, although this does not seem to be Crane’s idea, one may argue that non-prop-
ositional contents can, after all, represent states of affairs or facts. But, in fact, this possible replica does 
not work. Nominalized clauses do not represent, in the relevant sense, states of affairs or facts; they do 
not describe them, but, instead, name them. For this reason, nominalized clauses, such as ‘the fact that 
the cup is white’, cannot be true or false. They can only refer to or fail to refer to the relevant fact.
21 In that article, although he mainly deals with the nature of perceptual content, Crane also makes some 
by-passing references to the problem of justification. Reconstructing the debate between McDowell 
and Travis, Crane comes to claim that “I see no obstacle to the claim that seeing something [in Tra-
vis’s sense] can justify one’s judgment”, (Crane, 2013b, p. 232). Thus, Crane implies (at least in that 
passage) that, in order to justify a judgment, experience does not need to have conceptual content, as 
McDowell holds, nor even any other kind of content (this is Travis’s claim). However, this misunder-
stands the accusation of falling into the Myth of the Given, directed by McDowell against Travis. Ac-
cording to Travis, seeing a pig, say, under an oak is simply an awareness of some portion of the visible 
reality. If we have the concept of a pig, then we can judge that the pig is under the oak on the basis of 
that experience plus our ability to recognize that what we experience is an instance of a thing of a cer-
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by a demonstrative expression such as, for instance, “This red cube”. McDowell explic-
itly holds that this kind of content does not represent a state of affairs but, rather, an ob-
ject (McDowell, 2013, p. 154). Now, how could this kind of content be true or false? And 
without the possibility of being true or false, how could it be a reason at all? It is true that 
McDowell insists on the idea that experiences can be reasons for belief (McDowell, 2009, 
p. 270); however, it should be noted that not only the model of non-inferential justifica-
tion indicated above, based on the identity transition of contents, does not apply here, but 
also, and crucially, that it is not clear at all how perceptual states that represent mere ob-
jects could rationally justify propositional attitudes, such as empirical judgments and be-
liefs, which represent states of affairs.
Although McDowell is not explicit at this point, it might be thought that, when he 
holds that experience with intuitional content can be a reason for belief or judgment, he 
has in mind something as the following: judgment unpacks and articulates the unarticu-
lated and packed intuitional content of experience. Thus, if the intuitional content of an 
experience can be expressed by the demonstrative expression “This red cube,” one may ar-
ticulate, based on that content, the following two judgments: (i) “This is a red cube,” and 
(ii) “This cube is red.” Therefore, McDowell perhaps believes that, in this sense, the expe-
rience of this red cube can be a reason for judgments (i) and (ii). However, why should we 
accept that articulating and unpacking, in judgments (i) and (ii), the intuitional content of 
that experience is a reason-giving relation?22 A reason is often considered to be “a consider-
ation that counts in favor of” (Scanlon, 1998, p. 17) something else (a judgment or belief). 
Why should we take the intuitional content this red cube as a consideration in favor of the 
truth of (i) and (ii)? The content this red cube is not a case of this is thus and so; thus, it can 
be neither true nor false. It is not, properly speaking, a complete content—one may say—
but, rather, a part of a content. Since the putative content expressed by “this red cube” can-
not be true or false, then, it cannot help us to judge that (i) and (ii) are true, or probably 
true. So, an experience with the alleged content this red cube should not be considered to be 
a move in the logical space of reasons. As a result, it seems quite implausible to think that 
perceptual representations of objects, which cannot be true or false, can be reasons to be-
tain kind. For McDowell, this is a case of the Myth of the Given, because the mere presentation, in ex-
perience, of a pig does not count as an epistemic or cognitive state. In order to be able to judge that the 
pig is under the oak on the basis of our experience, the pig has to be seen as a pig and as being under the 
oak. If experience does not disclose the pig as a pig, we lack any basis for recognizing the pig as an ani-
mal of a certain kind. Recognition is something that takes place in experience itself; otherwise, it is too 
late for being the basis of a judgment. In other words, one cannot recognize that what one experiences 
is an instance of a thing of a certain kind (e.g., a pig), if one’s experience does not disclose to one the 
relevant thing as being a thing of a certain kind. This is the reason why McDowell insists on the idea 
that experience has conceptual content. In any case, the idea that a physical object (e.g., a pig) can ra-
tionally justify a judgment is, I think, so untenable as the idea that states with non-propositional con-
tent can do that: as a non-propositional content, an object is neither a bearer of truth-values.
22 A similar problem is apparent in Heck (2000). Heck holds that perceptual content is non-conceptual 
and, presumably, non-propositional. In trying to explain how experience could justify a judgment or 
belief, he claims that the content of a judgment “tracks” the content of the relevant experience. He also 
uses the terms “conceptualize”, “translate”, and “reflect” in order to characterize the epistemic relation 
between a judgment and an experience. However, none of these terms refers to a reason-giving rela-
tion. See Kalpokas (2018).
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lieve or judge that certain propositions are true or false. The failure of the identity transi-
tion of contents between experiences and beliefs is a failure in the transition of the relevant 
properties (e.g., truth-values) that seem to make possible the relevant rational relation be-
tween the contents of experiences and beliefs.23
Moreover, and for similar reasons, it seems that experiences, when they are credited 
with non-propositional content, cannot justify beliefs and judgments inferentially either.24 
In effect, an argument typically requires premises (i.e. bearers of truth-value) from which a 
conclusion (i.e. another bearer of truth-value) can be drawn. But non-propositional con-
tents cannot be true or false (let us remember that this is the point of Crane’s first objec-
tion to the propositional-attitude thesis). Thus, they are not apt to be premises from which 
to infer any conclusion. Lacking the possibility of being true or false, perceptual non-prop-
ositional content cannot transmit, deductively or inductively, the property of being true to 
the relevant conclusion.
I can express my point in still simpler terms: it is commonly assumed that empirical 
judgments and beliefs represent, when they are true, empirical facts. In this sense, if it is con-
ceded that, for example, a certain cup’s being white is a fact, then, it can be claimed that the 
fact that the cup is white makes the belief, or judgment, that the cup is white to be true. If 
perceptual experience is credited with propositional content and this content is the same as 
the content of the relevant belief or judgment, then, it can be claimed that the proposition 
“That cup is white”, which figures in the content of the experience, represents such a fact. 
So, the account about how perceptual experiences can be reasons for their corresponding be-
liefs or judgments is very simple: the very same content that is provided by experience is en-
dorsed in the relevant judgment or belief. In contrast, if the propositional content of expe-
rience is conceived as different from the relevant belief (e.g. “That object of such and such 
form is white”), the experience could rationally justify the correspondent belief inferentially. 
However, if experience had non-propositional content, i.e., if it did not represent facts when 
it is veridical but, rather, objects, scenes or whatever variety of non-propositional content 
might be, perceptual content could be neither a non-inferential, nor an inferential reason to 
23 Although I do not have space here to consider in detail other examples, I would like to mention the 
case of Peacocke, who claims: “Experiences give a thinker who possesses the relatively observational 
concept square not merely reasons but good reasons for forming the belief that the demonstratively 
presented object is square’ (Peacocke, 1992a, p. 80). Peacocke makes this statement only once he has 
introduced, besides the level of scenario content, the level of proto-propositional content, a level in 
which one is able to perceive something as a square, for instance, or as a regular diamond; so it is sen-
sible to think that Peacocke actually believes that it is this level of perceptual content the one that, 
crucially, makes possible for experience to be a reason for the relevant belief. (Indeed, it could be ar-
gued that the mere perceptually representation of a square surface, say, in an egocentric space does not 
amount to representing that surface as having the property of being square. On this point, see Castel-
lano, 2018). However, it could be legitimately thought here that, after all, Peacocke’s proto-proposi-
tions are not quite different, structurally speaking, from propositions, i.e. conceptual contents of the 
form “a is P” (see Castellano, 2018). So, it seems that, insofar as Peacocke’s perceptual non-conceptual 
content is non-propositional in nature, then it cannot be a reason for belief; and, conversely, insofar as 
it can be a reason for belief, it must be propositionally structured.
24 Even when someone might believe that it is implausible to apply the inferentialist model of justifica-
tion to experience, this is, of course, a possible theoretical alternative. Raleigh (2016) argues against 
that inferentialist model.
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hold the relevant judgment or belief about the cup. Thus, it seems that one would be obliged 
to abandon the intuitive idea that perceptual experiences can be reasons at all.25
A similar reasoning may be applied to other aspects of the content of perceptual ex-
perience. For example, besides the fact that the cup in question is white, my experience of 
the cup reveals to me, crucially, the presence of the cup itself. The fact that there is a cer-
tain cup in front of me, over there, is something that my experience of the cup also dis-
closes to me. This is the way I know that there is a certain cup in front of me. I would not 
be able to see that a certain cup is white if, at the same time, I did not see that this cup is 
present to me (or that there is a certain cup over there). The presence of the cup in front of 
me is something that is represented by my experience (Searle, 1983, p. 40). Thus, if we be-
lieve that experience has propositional content, how I can perceptually know that there is 
a certain cup in front of me could be naturally explained: the propositional content of my 
experience represents that fact. And as in the previous case, if experience in fact has propo-
sitional content, seeing that there is a certain cup in front of me could be a reason to judge 
that there is a certain cup in front of me.
In contrast, let us suppose that experience, due to its non-propositional content, does 
not reveal to us what there is in the world. In this model of perceptual content, the con-
tent of experience would not be the sort of content that represents states of affairs such as 
that there is a cup in front of me. Then, how could one know that there is a certain cup in 
front of one? It seems that if this sort of state of affairs was not perceptually available, then 
the knowledge of it would need to be inferred in some way. However, this surely would be 
unattractive. Typically, in looking at a certain cup, one does not infer that there is a cup in 
front of one; rather, one directly sees that there is one. But even if this consideration were 
dismissed, another crucial difficulty would arise: as it has been argued above, non-proposi-
tional contents cannot figure as premises of any inference at all. Thus, if we suppose that 
experience has non-propositional content, then, an inference to the judgment or belief that 
there is a certain cup in front of one cannot have as a premise the content of one’s experi-
ence.26 So, on this construal of the content of experience, experience could not be a reason 
to judge or believe that objects and their properties are present to the perceiver.
To sum up, if perceptual experience did not have propositional content, it would not 
represent, in the relevant sense, states of affairs such as that there is such and such object, 
property or event in front of us. For the same reason, experience could not represent states 
of affairs such as that a certain cup of tea is white, that the cup is to my left, etc. In such a 
case, as I have argued, experience could not be a reason to judge or believe that the world is 
such as experience represents it to be because it would be a capacity that it does not allow us 
to be in the appropriate epistemic contact with the relevant states of affairs, i.e. the states of 
affairs that are represented, or aim to be represented, by our judgments and beliefs. In other 
words, if experience had non-propositional content, a kind of content that cannot be true 
or false, it could not have the appropriate logical relations to judgments and beliefs, which 
25 This is the path taken by Burge (2003). I argue against Burge’s position in Kalpokas (2014).
26 At this point, it may be proposed that is not the putative non-propositional content of experience the 
one that figures in the required inference; instead, it is from the belief that one sees a certain cup in 
front of one that one can infer that there is a cup in front of one.  However, in such case it would be 
clear that the experience itself could not be one’s reason to judge or believe that there is a certain cup in 
front of one.
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are necessary to be epistemic reasons at all.27 As a result, it seems that Crane faces the fol-
lowing dilemma: either he holds that experience has non-propositional content, but then 
he must accept that he cannot accommodate the intuitive epistemic role of experience; or 
he acknowledges that experience has, in effect, that intuitive role, but then he must aban-
don his non-propositionalist thesis about the content of experience.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, I have discussed Crane’s arguments against the propositional-attitude thesis. 
In my opinion, his arguments do not entitle us to abandon the propositional-attitude the-
sis nor to hold the opposite thesis: that experience has non-propositional content. The in-
tertwined arguments presented in section 3 have had the purpose to show that Crane’s ob-
jections to the grounds on which the propositional-attitude thesis is based are not sound, 
and that for this reason, the proposal that experience has non-propositional content is not 
adequately motivated. Moreover, as I have argued in the final section of this article, there is 
an important reason to accept the idea that experience has propositional content: if expe-
rience actually has propositional content, it is possible to explain, in an intuitive way, the 
roles that are commonly attributed to experience. This argument, which has not been con-
sidered by Crane, is perfectly consistent with the argument from the truth-conditions of 
experience, which does not prevent us, as I have argued in section 3, from simultaneously 
considering experiences to be more or less accurate. Of course, this line of thought deserves 
more development and refinement, and for this reason I do not claim to have definitely 
settled the problem of whether experience has propositional content or not.28 Notwith-
standing this, I believe that the argument of appealing to the intuitive roles of experience 
not only looks promising, but also entitles us, especially when it is combined with my ob-
jections to Crane’s objections to the propositional-attitude thesis, to preserve the idea that 
perceptual experience has propositional content.29
27 Similar considerations may be applied to the other roles of experience. Let us consider, for example, 
the second role of experience (2), namely, that of providing knowledge of the reference of demonstra-
tives. Let us suppose that, in front of a certain book, you say “That book is wonderful!” In order to 
properly understand your exclamation, I have to be able to perceptually know what object you are talk-
ing about. But in order to do that, I have to be able to see that the relevant object is a book. Yet, this 
seems to require that experience has propositional content. Demonstrative expressions are properly 
understood when one perceives their referents. One cannot understand this kind of expressions with-
out perceptually identifying their referents. But perceptually identifying something is to perceive it as 
such and such a thing or property, that is, to perceive that it is such and such object or property. Let us 
consider now the relation between experience and action. In order to form the intention of taking a 
certain cup, which is on the table, and correctly performing the act of taking it, I have to be able to see 
that there is a cup of tea on the table. Without this capacity to perceptually represent this state of af-
fairs, it is hard to understand how I could be able to intentionally take the cup in question.
28 For further discussion, see Raleigh (2016). At some points, Raleigh seems to believe, wrongly I think, 
that only non-propositional contents could provide non-inferential reasons for beliefs. For the idea 
that experience, having propositional content, non-inferentially justifies beliefs, see McDowell (2009, 
p. 131).
29 I am grateful to two anonymous reviewers of Theoria for their helpful comments and suggestions.  
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